Jinnah: The Sole Spokesman review
“How did a Pakistan come about which fitted the interests of most Muslims so poorly?“ This is the question posed by acclaimed historian, Ayesha Jalal.
In her book the ‘Sole Spokesman’, Jalal explores the role of Muhammad Ali Jinnah - the architect of Pakistan and the country’s first Governor-General.
Jinnah’s character and motivations around partition and the creation of Pakistan have been been criticised by mainstream British and Indian nationalist narratives.
The Sole Spokesman is an in-depth work that sees beyond these commentaries and analyses a man who dedicated his whole life to the fight for independence from the British. He sadly died just a year after the creation of Pakistan.
Jinnah had always been a secular Indian nationalist. Ironically, he distanced himself from the Congress due to the increasing influence of Gandhi and his religious rhetoric. However, in later years Jinnah became a proponent of the ‘two-nation theory’. He asserted that Muslims and Hindus were two distinct nations and should have their own structures, identity and governance.
Jalal argues that this was a political tactic and the call for Pakistan was a bargaining chip that Jinnah used to protect India’s Muslims and ensure they had a say at the centre of government. Jalal says: “The Lahore resolution should therefore be seen as a bargaining counter.” She adds: “The resolution made no mention of ‘partition’, certainly none of ‘Pakistan.’”
“Asserting that Muslims were a nation avoided the logic of numbers. As a community, they were consigned to being a perpetual minority in an united India. As a nation they were entitled to equal status, irrespective of their numbers, since the family of nations contains the big and the small.” Ayesha Jalal
Jinnah wanted to be the sole spokesman for the Muslim community at an all-India level. For this status, he had to convince Muslims that he was their leader, as well as convince the Congress leadership and the British. This was not an easy task as Jalal describes in this book.
He had more ready support in the Muslim minority provinces, but had less appeal in the Muslim majority areas. In order to get them on his side, he needed to appeal to the masses and use the communal card as his principal stand.
Jalal evidences how Jinnah never wanted partition. His call for ‘Pakistan’ was not defined and purposefully vague. It took on a life of its own, and would mean different things to different people. Jinnah used the idea of a separate homeland for India’s Muslims more as a way to bargain with Congress and the British.
In fact, right until the last days before partition, when Congress called for the division of the Muslim majority, areas of Bengal and Punjab to spite Jinnah, he rejected this tactic because he did not want those regions partitioned.
There was an underlying fear amongst Muslims of being ruled by a Hindu dominated Congress. They worried about being prevented from practicing their religion and culture freely. The growing communalism and emergence of the Hindu far right was also concerning. Jalal says: “The fear of a powerful centre dominated by the Congress had been the main reason why the Muslim-majority province politicians had rallied behind Jinnah and the League.“
Although initially, the Muslim majority provinces were happy with the status quo. They had a good relationship with the minorities and they did not want to rock the boat. However, as the situation became more and more uncertain, it got to the point that they would either have to be under the Congress or the Muslim League leadership, they chose the latter.
As much as the Congress blamed Jinnah for the division of India and the uncontrollable communalism, they neglected to recognise the role they played in the way things turned out. The Congress was uncompromising in its demand for a united India and wanted to dominate the centre.“It appeared that Congress was not ready to meet the League, or indeed the Mission (Cabinet Mission) half way.”
In the lead up to partition, the British wanted to set up an interim government. Jinnah was reluctant to be part of it because he feared the Congress was being underhand and wanting to dominate it, reducing the power of the Muslim League.
Jinnah wrote to Viceroy Wavell on 31 July 1946, and said that there was “no chance of my Working Committee” agreeing to come into the interim government. The proposals for it were “most detrimental to the Muslim League” and were “obviously intended to appease the Congress.”
On 16 August 1946, Jinnah declared a ‘Direct Action Day.’ He told Muslims that it should be a day of peaceful reflection, not a day for the purpose of resorting to direct action in any formal shape. Sadly, it got out of control and led to terrible communal violence.
This was not Jinnah’s intention. He knew he was being pushed into a corner – and he was trying to find ways and strategies to stand up for the rights of his community.
Under an interim government, the Congress were totally against the Grouping scheme which would give Muslims some form of protection. Jalal writes: “Convinced that a coalition government was the only way of preventing civil war in India, Wavell made a last-ditch attempt to get assurances from the Congress on the grouping scheme. But his talks with Gandhi and Nehru failed to produce the desired result.”
Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State for India) on 28 August 1946 about Congress rejecting the Grouping scheme. Jalal says: “Wavell in his turn thought this provided “convincing evidence that Congress always meant to use their position in the Interim Government to break up the Muslim League and in the Constituent Assembly to destroy the Grouping scheme which was the one effective safeguard for the Muslims.”
Congress was using underhand tactics so that they could remain the dominant power. Congress was known to be in direct touch with the British cabinet behind the Viceroy Wavell’s back. This clearly annoyed Wavell and undermined his position. However Nehru certainly exerted some influence as the British Government actually decided to replace him.
In an extract of a letter from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence on 10 September 1946, he said that “If only Congress would give a little, Jinnah showed that he was willing to give more, and bend over backwards to ‘take less than his present demands’, ‘especially as the Congress seem to aim at consolidating their power and disregarding the League altogether.” (As cited by Jalal)
Jalal states: “By contrast Jinnah, that monster in the demonology of not very perceptive Indian and British chroniclers, that triumphant hero in Pakistani hagiography, was found by Wavell… to be ‘very quiet and reasonable, and… anxious for a settlement if it can be done without loss of prestige.” This was in contrast to the narratives that paint Jinnah as difficult, hostile and cold.
And when the Muslim League did enter the interim government, Congress decided to make life very difficult for them. Instead of exploring the possibilities of working together, Congress decided to take the League’s entry into the interim government as a declaration of war. They were constantly lambasting and insulting the League on various issues.
London was also playing dirty politics and wanted to speed everything up in terms of leaving India. Therefore it was in their interest to put pressure on Jinnah, and generally saw him as difficult because he did not agree with their approach. Jinnah however was very resilient, even in the face of all the serious political setbacks, hostilities and likelihood of failure.
The British Government knew and wanted its successor to be the Congress. They were keen to keep communication lines open with the Congress as opposed to the Muslim League. Wavell did not agree with the Government or Nehru’s approach, and that is why he was replaced.
The last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten was sent in March 1947 in order to get the British out of India rapidly.
The League needed the form of Pakistan to be agreed before the British left India because they did not trust Congress, and were worried that the Congress would try and annihilate the Pakistan they were trying to create.
For Jinnah, it was better if he had more time for his vision of Pakistan to be realised. Unfortunately, he was fighting against the Congress and the British, who wanted a rapid exit. For the Congress, they wanted a strong unitary centre, which was more likely to happen if it was done quickly. As for the British, they wanted to make sure that their economic and strategic interests in South Asia would remain.
Jinnah wanted to get a settlement based on ‘Pakistan’ at the centre first before Muslim provinces would be allowed to settle terms with their non-Muslim populations. However, on 8 March 1947, the Congress working committee passed the historic resolution which demanded the partition of Punjab, a principle which would if necessary be extended to Bengal.
Jinnah was in a bind because he had only two options, one was to agree to the split of the Punjab and Bengal, and two was to be forced back into a union, where Congress was the real master, capable of cutting the league out of sharing power.
Jalal says: “The ‘two-nation’ theory, with which Jinnah had hoped to get the League a share of power at the centre was the sword which was now cutting his Pakistan down to size.”
Conclusion
Jalal says: “Ironically, and unfairly, the horrors which lie so close to the surface of India have been laid at the door of this man (Jinnah) of orderly constitutional advance, blamed upon his ‘Pakistan’ and upon the irreconcilable differences between Muslims and Hindus which his own career had consistently tried to bridge.”
However, the other parties are let off the hook. Congress has a significant part to play as well. They refused to compromise, and Nehru especially was motivated by a personal rivalry against Jinnah and wanted to crush him and his Pakistan demand. Congress would also never agree to parity with the League. In fact, Jalal argues: “It was Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was against partition.“
The use of exclusionary tactics by the Congress had a real impact in the end result of partition. In order to govern a mixed community, it was vital to be careful with language and terminology. The Congress failed in this respect and were guilty of using Hindu religious terms and references. This was even more significant as Congress always insisted that it represented all people. In practice - this did not appear so.
The British obviously are to blame for the majority of the problems around partition. Lord Mountbatten especially had a pivotal role in the disastrous situation that unfolded. He disliked Jinnah immensely and conversely regarding Nehru as a good friend.
Mountbatten wanted to “ram home to Jinnah and his followers, the folly of their demands.” According to Jalal, in the “minutes of the first day of the Governors’ conference on 15 April 1947, Mountbatten was quoted as saying that anything that resulted in “torpedoing” Pakistan was of advantage in that it led the way back to a more common-sense solution.”
Mountbatten regarded Jinnah as a “psychopathic case,” he also called him a ‘lunatic’, ‘evil genius’, ‘clot’, ‘bastard’ and the like.
Therefore, a man who was in charge of partition in India, when he clearly had his favourites, was never going to deliver a fair and balanced outcome. And sadly, the situation that both Pakistan, India and Bangladesh find themselves in now, and the resulting trauma is directly because of the actions that the British took and allowed to happen.
London revised Mountbatten’s Partition Plans to give all the states the chance to opt in or out of the union of India. Mountbatten, in ‘an act of friendship’– showed Nehru the Plan on condition he wouldn’t discuss it with Congress colleagues – and kept the plan away from Jinnah. “Once again Mountbatten failed to observe protocol or the pretence of impartiality.”
Mountbatten told London that the Partition Plan needed to be redone, and that it would be done in New Delhi. “In recasting the plan ‘in principle and (in) detail’, Mountbatten followed Congress principles to the smallest essential detail” states Jalal.
“Congress, his own followers, and above all the contradictions in his own strategy had reduced Jinnah’s Pakistan to the moth-eaten version which he had rejected so vehemently on more than one occasion” according to Jalal.
And even at the last stage, Jinnah did not want to accept the Pakistan that he was being given or the division of Bengal and Punjab. But Mountbatten forced him into submission.
Ironically and to Jalal’s disappointment, “Mountbatten boldly claimed credit for having accomplished, in less than two and a half months, one of the ‘greatest administrative operations in history.’” His lack of empathy, conscience, and timing reflected a man who had no deep connection or feeling towards the land or its people. Put simply, he just did not care.
